Social Security Reform: Improving Benefit Adequacy and Economic Security for Women by Smeeding, Timothy M.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
1999 
Social Security Reform: Improving Benefit Adequacy and 
Economic Security for Women 
Timothy M. Smeeding 
Syracuse University, Maxwell School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Smeeding, Timothy M., "Social Security Reform: Improving Benefit Adequacy and Economic Security for 
Women" (1999). Center for Policy Research. 27. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/27 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
$*,1*678’,(6352*5$032/,&<%5,()
Social Security Reform:
Improving Benefit Adequacy and
Economic Security for Women
7LPRWK\06PHHGLQJ
1R
Timothy M. Smeeding, Ph.D., is Maxwell Professor
of Public Policy and Director of the Center for Policy
Research.
This policy brief is based in part on a larger report,
“Social Security Reform and Older Women:
Improving the System,” by the author, Carroll L. Estes,
and Lou Glasse, sponsored by the Retirement Research
Foundation. It is available in hard copy from the
Gerontological Society of America or electronically
from the CPR Web site at <http://www-
cpr.maxwell.syr.edu>.
The research reported herein was performed pursuant
to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration
(SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research
Consortium at Boston College and Syracuse
University. The opinions and conclusions are solely
those of the author and should not be construed as
representing the opinions or policy of SSA or any
agency of the Federal government.
The Policy Brief series is a collection of essays on
current public policy issues in aging, health, income
security, metropolitan studies, and related research
done by or on behalf of the Center for Policy Research
(CPR) at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs.
Single copies of this publication may be obtained at no
cost from the CPR Web site at <http://www-
cpr.maxwell.syr.edu> or from the Center for Policy
Research, 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020.
© 1999, Syracuse University. This publication may be
distributed freely for educational and researcher uses
as long as this copyright notice is attached. No
commercial use of this material may be made without
express written permission.
3ROLF\%ULHI
$*,1*678’,(6352*5$032/,&<%5,()
Social Security Reform:
Improving Benefit Adequacy and
Economic Security for Women
7LPRWK\06PHHGLQJ
1Social Security Reform:
Improving Benefit Adequacy and
Economic Security for Women
Introduction
This Policy Brief is designed to raise awareness of the current
and future economic circumstances of older women, and the
ways in which Social Security reform can help alleviate their
unmet needs. It considers the gaps in benefit adequacy and
economic security that are not addressed by current Social
Security reform proposals and then suggests a series of modest,
low-cost reforms to help close these gaps. If our proposals are
adopted, Social Security reform will not only close the long-run
financial deficit, but it will also greatly reduce the future poverty
status of older women, particularly those who live alone. This is
an opportunity for progressive reform as well as for budgetary
balance.
The Social Security program was designed over 60 years ago for
a world in which mothers worked at home, raised children, and
were widowed young, but not divorced; where fathers worked in
industrial settings; and where both men and women had much
shorter life expectancies at older ages than those of succeeding
generations. Back in 1935 the founders of Social Security did not
anticipate that women would become the major beneficiaries of
the program. Increasingly, women rely on Social Security as the
major source of their economic security at older ages, much more
so than do men. Therefore, women are the group with the most to
gain or lose from reform of the Social Security system and
modification of its benefit formulae.
Future women beneficiaries will be different. Women’s lives are
changing rapidly in many ways. More women work outside the
home today, and about half of all marriages end in divorce.
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Increasing numbers of children grow up in a single-parent family,
typically that of the mother. The higher future benefits expected
for women with their own careers in the labor market need to be
balanced against the potentially bleak economic situation in old
age for a large and growing number of divorced and never
married women.
Current Economic Status of Older Women
Benefit adequacy and economic security for women in old age
are our primary concerns. Social Security is the only guaranteed,
inflation-protected, lifetime benefit for older people. We start by
looking at the prevalence of women among older people, then
move to the poverty status of older women and the proportion of
elderly Social Security recipients who are women.
• More than two in three persons aged 75 and over are women;
and almost three in four persons aged 85 and older are women
(Social Security Administration 1998).
The population aged 85 and over is the fastest growing group
among the old, and their economic and health care needs are of
particular importance. The greater one’s age, the greater the
degree of insecurity among the elderly.
At least one member of the average couple who retires today and
begins receiving Social Security benefits will live an average of
25 years (Social Security Administration 1998). Women at age
65 are expected to live an average 3.3 years longer than men, and
because most women marry older men, women are three times
more likely to be widowed in old age than are men (Anderson
1998). This produces an expectation of over 15 years that the
average older female survivor spends as a widow (Schoen and
Weinick 1993).
• Three of every four poor elderly people are women.
Timothy M. Smeeding
3
Poverty rates for the elderly are highest among divorced, never
married, and widowed women—all about 20 percent—compared
to a poverty rate of below 5 percent for married women (Figure
1). And older United States women have poverty rates 1.5 to 20
times higher than those found in other western industrialized
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) nations (Smeeding 1998; Burkhauser and Smeeding
1994).
Moreover, a recent report argues that the probability of ever
being in poverty between the ages of 60 and 85 is 38.3 percent
among both men and women. The probability is 37 percent
among white, married older women with less than 12 years of
education, and 63 percent if they are unmarried. For black,
1RWHVD³0DUULHG&RXSOHV·LQFOXGHVVHSDUDWHGLQGLYLGXDOV2YHUDOOSRYHUW\
UDWHVE\JHQGHUDUHIURP3RYHUW\LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV%XUHDXRIWKH
&HQVXV6HSWHPEHU3RYHUW\UDWHVE\JHQGHUDQGPDULWDOVWDWXVDUH
XQSXEOLVKHGQXPEHUVIURPWKH0DUFK&XUUHQW3RSXODWLRQ6XUYH\
6RFLDO6HFXULW\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ2IILFHRI3ROLF\7KH&HQVXV
%XUHDX¶VSRYHUW\WKUHVKROGIRUVLQJOHSHUVRQVDJHRUROGHUOLYLQJ
DORQHLVD\HDURUDERXWSHUPRQWKDQGIRUROGHU
FRXSOHV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
Figure 1. Poverty Rates of Elderly Men and Women by Marital Status, 1997
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married older women with less than 12 years of education, the
probability rises to 66 percent, and to 88 percent if they are
unmarried (Rank and Hirschl 1999).
• The typical elderly Medicare beneficiary spent almost 19
percent of her income on health care in 1998 (Moon 1999).
Out-of-pocket health care expenses act like a tax on income,
forcing low-income elders to choose between health care or food
and housing. If we follow the National Academy of Science
recommendations and adjust incomes for taxes, in-kind benefits
and out-of-pocket expenses for health care, the poverty rate for
all older women living alone rises from 21 percent to 28-30
percent depending on whether other types of benefits are
included in the income definition (Short, Garner, Johnson, and
Doyle 1999). Both Medicare reform and Social Security reform
need to address this issue.
• Without Social Security and barring any behavioral change,
more than half of all older women would be poor today
(Social Security Administration 1998).
Women are far less likely than men to qualify for private
pensions (30 percent vs. 48 percent in 1994). Even when women
do receive their own pensions, they qualify for benefits that are
only about one-half the median benefit received by men. And
about one-third of husbands still do not elect joint and survivor
options for their private pensions upon retirement, despite federal
legislation to increase such determinations.
Women make up over 60 percent of all Social Security
beneficiaries. On average, unmarried women receive 72 percent
of their incomes from Social Security. The percentage of income
that comes from Social Security rises with age, rises among older
women living alone, and rises as overall income declines. For
instance, widows aged 80 to 84 with below median incomes rely
on Social Security for more than 80 percent of those incomes
(Macunovich 1999).
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While poverty rates for older women are high, Social Security
keeps far more older women out of poverty. Last year, Social
Security reduced the poverty rate among older women from 53 to
14 percent (among men the rate was reduced from 41 percent to 8
percent). For elderly widows, as well as for women aged 85 and
over, Social Security plays an even larger role, reducing the
poverty rate from more than 60 percent to about 20 percent
(Porter, Larin, and Primus 1999).
Older Women in the Future
Today’s older women are at risk even in the current defined
benefit (i.e., guaranteed benefit level) Social Security system. In
particular, unmarried older women—never married, divorced,
separated, or widowed—are economically vulnerable and face
multiple economic and social risks. Some of these risks include
poverty, chronic illness, physical and mental disability, and social
isolation (O’Rand 1994).
Women have fewer years of earnings and also lower earnings due
to their caretaking roles: women interrupt their careers to perform
many years of unpaid work, caring for their children, elderly
parents, or disabled spouses. Therefore, today’s elderly women
are less likely to have adequate private pensions and more likely
to depend upon Social Security during their retirement years than
are men. These risk factors are interrelated and contribute to the
38 percent chance of experiencing poverty before age 85 that
older women face today.
What about older women in the future?
• Since more women are working in the paid labor
market, can we expect more private pension
participation, more Social Security benefits based
on their own earnings, and increased savings to
enhance the economic security of older women in
the future?
Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
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The percentage of all women beneficiaries who receive benefits
based on only their own earnings will rise from 37 percent in
2000 to 56 percent in 2030 according to the Social Security
Administration (National Economic Council 1998). As times
change and women’s work histories improve, more women will
collect higher private pensions and Social Security benefits based
on their own earnings.
But women will still interrupt their work careers far more often
than men to parent their children and to care for elderly parents.
Women are more likely than men to:
• sacrifice market work to provide early life caregiving for
children;
• be forced to change careers or location to suit their husband’s
career job choices;
• have their retirement timing determined by their husband’s
retirement date;
• interrupt work to provide care to their elder parents,
grandparents or siblings.
This will affect retirement income, because Social Security
benefits depend on the 35 highest years of earnings and women
will have far more years with no countable earnings (“zero
years”) than do men, even in the mid-21st century (Smeeding,
Estes, and Glasse 1999). In short, women’s economic and social
experiences are different from men’s and will continue to be so
as far into the 21st century as we can foresee. Most of the life
events listed above will lower market earnings and put women at
greater risk of inadequate retirement income security compared to
men. Combinations of these events compound their negative
effects on retirement incomes as they accumulate. Hence, both
the changing and unchanging experiences of women’s economic
lives should be taken into account by Social Security reformers.
Timothy M. Smeeding
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Nearly one-half of all elderly women will continue to rely at least
in part on their husbands’ Social Security benefits. And married
women will continue to rely on their husbands’ pensions under
joint and survivor options.
• Will there be changes in marital histories from
today’s elderly women? If so, what is the
predicted impact on elderly women in the future?
Table 1 shows that among women aged 45 to 49, the percentage
married has dropped sharply from 81.4 percent in 1970 to 67.9
percent in 1997. The percentage divorced has increased sharply
(from 5.3 to 17.7 percent), and the percentage never married has
risen sharply (from 3.9 to 8.0 percent) between these cohorts.
7DEOH&KDQJHVLQ0DULWDO6WDWXVDPRQJ:RPHQ$JHGWR
LQDQG
 
0DUULHG  
’LYRUFHG  
:LGRZHG  
6HSDUDWHG  
1HYHU0DUULHG  
6RXUFH %DVHG RQ WKH &XUUHQW 3RSXODWLRQ 6XUYH\ DV
UHSRUWHGE\6WHXHUOH
While more women will have greater lifetime earnings in the
future, they will be increasingly likely to be unmarried and will
be at greater risk, due to higher rates of divorce and greater
periods of single parenthood, than were previous generations of
elders. For black women, the numbers will be much higher due to
higher divorce rates. More women, both black and white will
choose to have families outside of marriage, and the number of
women who are predicted never to marry will also increase (Iams
and Butrica 1999).
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For a divorced spouse, age 62, to be eligible for retirement
benefits based on a past marriage, that marriage must have lasted
at least ten years. Yet the projected fraction of divorced women
aged 62 or older in 2020 who are expected to have been married
for less than ten years is 37.2 percent (Panis 1999). This,
combined with the decrease in remarriage rates and the
increasing prevalence of unmarried individuals, threatens to
erode the future Social Security protection provided to many
lower-income women.
• How will divorce and nonmarriage affect future
women Social Security beneficiaries under current
program rules?
The net outcome of these changes in earnings, pensions, and
marital status is very difficult to predict with any degree of
certainty. However, the Social Security Administration’s Office
of Policy has developed the Modeling Income in the Near-Term
(MINT) Model to predict the distribution of retirement income
for future Social Security beneficiaries. One way to use the
model is to compare economic and demographic differences
among the actual retired Social Security population (aged 62 and
above) in 1991 and the same projected population for 2020, when
persons born between 1926 and 1965, including the baby boom
elderly, will be receiving Social Security benefits.
Before this model was developed, projections of the economic
status of the baby boomers were limited to the “average” elderly
person. This model allows us to move beyond averages and to
consider future distributional changes in earnings, pensions,
marriage, divorce, labor force participation, and other important
economic and demographic factors. While there are limits to all
projections, they are absolutely essential if the designers of Social
Security reform schemes are to understand how different schemes
affect women.
Timothy M. Smeeding
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Figure 2 presents some results based on this model (Iams and
Butrica 1999; Smith and Toder 1999; Butrica, Cohen, and Iams
1999).
One projection from the model is that in 2020 fewer women will
receive benefits as married and widowed beneficiaries than at
present. Declines in marriage rates will reduce the former, while
better health for older men will reduce the number of widowed
beneficiaries. In contrast, the fraction of divorced women will
rise three-fold, from 6.4 percent to almost 19 percent, while the
number of never married will rise from 4.1 to 5.6 percent (see
Table 2 below).
Figure 2. Preliminary Results from the MINT Model:
Poverty Rates of Elderly Women Beneficiaries by Marital Status, 1991 and 2020a
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The broad picture from Figure 2 is that:
• The poverty rate for older women receiving Social Security
benefits in 2020 will be exactly the same as it was in 1991, 12
percent.
• Poverty rates will be a bit lower for married, divorced, and
widowed women, but will stay high among divorced women
(22 percent) and widowed women (15 percent).
• Poverty among never-married women, many of whom will be
never-married mothers in 2020, will increase from 23 to 35
percent.
• Poverty among married women, which is only 4 percent in
1991, is expected to decline to 3 percent in 2020.
7DEOH(VWLPDWHVRI:RPHQ¶V0DULWDO6WDWXVIRU$OO:RPHQ$JHG
DQG2YHU:KR$UH6RFLDO6HFXULW\%HQHILFLDULHVLQ
DQG
 
0DUULHG  
:LGRZHG  
’LYRUFHGRU6HSDUDWHG  
1HYHU0DUULHG  
6RXUFH 66$0,170RGHO3URMHFWLRQ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
In addition, older women in the future will continue to be alone
after the death of a spouse, to need formal care after the onset of
disability at older age, and to spend longer time in retirement at
older ages.
• These results suggest that many of tomorrow’s
female Social Security recipients will be no better
off than today’s, and that poverty and insecurity
will be as much a problem of older women in 2020
as in 1991 or 1999.
Timothy M. Smeeding
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Despite the “good news” of greater labor force participation of
women, which will increase the number of women with pensions
and long earnings careers at higher earnings levels, there is also
the “bad news” that divorce, never marrying, and the poor
earnings futures of low-skilled women will yield poverty
outcomes that mirror those we find today. Therefore, Social
Security reformers should be wary of reform elements that put
benefit adequacy or insurance protection at risk. Lower income
older women will need Social Security just as much or more in
the future as they do today.
Economic and social change will have both positive and negative
effects on the economic security of tomorrow’s women in old
age. One can hope that women’s earnings, Social Security
benefits, and private pensions will grow to mirror those of men,
but we must realize that tomorrow’s women will experience
many of the same insecurities and risks due to their social roles
and career work and family patterns as do those of today (Iams
and Sandell 1998). If we as a society want to reduce poverty
among older women, we must take precautions now to provide
even better levels of benefit adequacy and economic security
through the reformed Social Security system. In particular, we
should better protect those individual women who will lose more
than is gained overall from these ongoing and tumultuous social
and economic changes.
Proposals to Strengthen Benefit Adequacy and
Economic Security for Older Women
The facts reviewed above suggest that older women are clearly at
a substantial economic disadvantage compared to men. Social
Security reform proposals are designed to provide financial
stability by closing the projected long-run gap between revenues
and liabilities of the Social Security system, but by and large they
are not designed to increase benefit adequacy or economic
security, or to lower poverty rates among older women. As we
have seen, poverty rates among older women will be the same in
Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
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2020 as they are today unless we also move to improve the
benefit adequacy and insurance features of the system.
Other measures are needed to increase the economic well-being
of older women and provide a true floor to their Social Security
income. The goal of this brief is to outline a set of interrelated
strategies rather than to suggest one single strategy for reducing
poverty in very old age. There are three elements to this package:
(1) better survivors’ benefits, (2) more equitable benefits for
divorcees, and (3) a better income safety net. All three work
together to play an important role in alleviating economic
insecurity and poverty in old age.
1. Policy Options for Survivors’ Benefits
The current Social Security program structure is built upon
individual-based payroll taxes but family-based benefits. As a
result, it provides different amounts of benefits to different
workers who may have paid exactly the same lifetime payroll
taxes, depending on their marital histories and their spouses’
earnings. Each spouse in a married couple can collect either his
or her retired worker benefit, or a spousal benefit based on their
partner’s earnings history, whichever is higher. For the spouse of
a living retired worker, the full benefit is one-half the worker
benefit; for a survivor, it is 100 percent of the deceased spouse’s
benefit.
Unfortunately, under these rules, a two-earner couple may be
paid less than a one-earner couple in return for the same or higher
total Social Security payroll taxes paid by both earners. For the
survivors of such marriages, the contrast in benefits can even be
greater. Indeed, if the two couples pay exactly the same total
payroll taxes, the surviving spouse of a couple with equal-earning
spouses can receive a benefit equal to one-half the benefit
received by the survivor of a one-earner couple with the same
taxable earnings! (See Burkhauser and Smeeding 1994; Devine
1998.)
Timothy M. Smeeding
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The total benefits for a two-earner couple and the benefits for its
surviving spouse depend directly on the division of total covered
earnings between husband and wife, given the total payroll taxes
paid. Because most wives have lower lifetime earnings than their
husbands, and because most wives outlive their husbands and
collect survivor benefits, this disadvantage in benefits for two-
earner couples is generally viewed as a disadvantage for working
wives. It creates a major inequity, particularly as the earnings of
wives continue to rise relative to men as a fraction of total
household earnings (Devine 1998).
Social Security reform should be aimed at strengthening rather
than weakening survivors’ benefits. Social Security survivors’
benefits are the key feature of older women’s economic well-
being for the 15 years in old age the average female survivor
spends as a widow. Survivor’s benefits are crucial to the
economic well-being of spouses with lower lifetime earnings.
To overcome this inequity, we urge consideration of plans that
would provide a better return on earnings and a better survivors’
benefit for older women.
• For example, a lower initial benefit for couples of 133 percent
of the higher earner’s initial individual benefit upon retirement
(to reduce costs) has been proposed in combination with a
higher benefit for the surviving spouse of 75 percent of both
spouses’ combined initial benefits. This option reduces the
spousal benefit from one-half to one-third of worker benefits
upon initial receipt, and raises survivor’s benefits to three-
fourths of the couple’s combined benefit, rearranging benefit
levels over the “retired lifetime” of the couple.
Such a solution would go a long way toward helping lower
earning women who are married at the time of Social Security
receipt, once they reach widowhood and survivor status, because
it raises benefits for older women with earnings and it shifts
benefits from early in retirement, when the couple is
economically better off, to later in retirement, when the surviving
Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
14
spouse depends more on Social Security to avoid poverty. The
Social Security Administration has estimated that this plan would
add about 7 percent (0.15 percent of taxable wages) to the current
Social Security deficit figure of 2.1 percentage points of long-
term taxable wages.
This policy change was recommended by the Social Security
Administration’s 1994-1996 Advisory Council (1997), by Aaron
and Reischauer (1998), and by President Clinton in October
1998.
Similar policy alternatives could also be adopted for survivors’
benefits depending on budgetary circumstances. For instance, for
each 1 percent reduction in the initial spouse benefit, 2 percent
higher benefits could be paid to all survivors at no extra cost to
the system (Iams and Sandell 1998; Burkhauser and Smeeding
1994). More costly options are also available. Both couples’
initial benefits and the surviving spouse’s benefits could be based
on the combined earnings of both spouses. Improving the return
on past contributions for spouses who currently receive little or
nothing, while at the same time providing higher benefits to older
survivors (in return for lower initial benefits in some cases),
improves both individual equity and income security for two-
earner couples. At the same time it improves the anti-poverty
effectiveness of the Social Security system as a whole and better
protects older women who are the large fraction of survivors.
2. Policy Options for Divorcees
As the fraction of divorced and not remarried females aged 62 or
over rises from 6 to 18 percent of all women between 1991 and
2020, the number and percentage of divorced women with a less
than ten-year marriage will also increase. As mentioned above,
the Social Security MINT Model projects that in 2020 more than
37 percent of these divorcees will have a less than ten-year
marriage history and will therefore not qualify for benefits based
on their former spouse’s Social Security earnings history (Panis
1999). This means that a large proportion of future older women
Timothy M. Smeeding
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will receive no Social Security benefit from former marriages.
There are at least two solutions to this problem:
• Lower the number of years required to be married prior to
divorce in order to collect benefits based on the earnings
history of the former spouse. This strategy was followed
earlier by Social Security when the years required were
lowered from 20 to 10 years.
• Institute earnings sharing for all years of marriage—for
divorced men and women only—thus making lifetime Social
Security contributions proportionate to covered earnings over
the number of years married, by splitting credits for earned
income between the couple over the years married. In effect,
this treats a Social Security account as one might treat any
other asset acquired or built up during a marriage.
Since the amount of benefit for which a divorced woman
qualifies under the first option (or under current rules) is
independent of the number of years married beyond ten (Steuerle
1999), the second proposal above is liable to be more equitable to
divorced women and for the system as a whole, as it is
proportional to the length of the marriage without setting a
specific minimum number of years. Moreover, as divorced
women continue to increase their countable earnings before and
after marriage, earnings credits earned for years of marriage plus
own earnings are liable to add up to a respectable “own” earnings
history and a higher initial individual level of old age benefits
under Social Security.
3. Policy Options for Economically Vulnerable Older
Women
The 133/75 percent benefit option proposed earlier does nothing
to help a woman whose benefits, based on her own earnings, are
less than one-third of her husband’s. For these survivors, 75
percent of a 133 percent initial benefit is the same outcome as the
current system (i.e., 67 percent of a 150 percent initial benefit).
Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
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And for widows in extreme old age, benefit adequacy will remain
a paramount consideration even if spousal benefits are reformed
as outlined above.
Furthermore, proposals to improve spouses’ benefits do little, if
anything, for divorced or never married women, the groups at
highest risk of poverty in old age (Figure 2). Even our solution of
earnings sharing at divorce is still liable to leave many older
divorcees with below poverty benefits if their earnings histories
are poor (e.g., from a later divorce combined with several years
of child rearing).
The spousal benefit and divorce equity reform efforts therefore
leave two types of economically vulnerable unmarried older
women: those who are not married at the time of initial benefit
receipt, and very old women.
The numbers of divorced and never married women are most
certainly going to increase among the baby boom generation, as
shown in Table 2. Iams and Butrica (1999) estimate that women
unmarried at time of first benefit receipt will rise to 30 percent of
women aged 62 or over in 2020.
There will be a much larger fraction of very old (aged 85 and
older) women who have simply outlived their partners, assets,
and savings. Because of early retirement and length of time spent
depending on Social Security, these older women may find
themselves living for 25 to 30 years on benefits that are only
indexed to increases in prices. Given a reasonable rate of
economic growth among the rest of the population, these women
will have standards of living that continue to decline relative to
the rest of the population despite a full cost-of-living-adjustment
(COLA) for their Social Security benefits.
Some members of both groups will slip through the cracks and
find themselves primarily reliant on Social Security at very old
ages, and both groups include the large majority of poor elderly
women. Our policy goal is to provide economic support to all
Timothy M. Smeeding
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vulnerable older women at reasonable cost and without creating a
set of disincentives for economic self-support.
Two types of options would benefit this needy group:
• An enhanced Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
The SSI program once covered 2.3 million elderly (1974) but by
1999 had fallen to 1.4 million elderly beneficiaries and is forecast
to fall further to 1.0 million by 2007 (U.S. Congress 1998, Table
3-W:310). The SSI benefit guarantee for a single elderly person
is 75 percent of the poverty level (Social Security Administration
1999), and 80 percent of the poverty level for a beneficiary who
also has Social Security (the law allows the recipient to set aside
$20 per month of Social Security in determining benefits). With
few exceptions all other sources of income are “taxed” at 100
percent by SSI in determining benefits. Further, a single eligible
beneficiary must have liquid assets of less than $2,000 (U.S.
Congress 1998).
The combined effect of the income and asset provisions are to
greatly reduce the number of elderly who are eligible for the
program. Recent evidence suggests that these asset limits also
discourage savings by the elderly (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
1995). And low-income elders who qualify for SSI but have
Social Security benefits as well end up with just $20 per month
more than if they never qualified for Social Security at all. The
SSI Reform Commission (Social Security Administration 1992)
recommended easing these asset limits to a level of $10,000 or
more.
A proposal that eases asset limits, allows beneficiaries to protect
up to $175 (not $20) per month of Social Security benefits, and
has a qualifying age of 62 (not 65) would provide added
protection for low-income women (and men) at low overall
system cost. Under an expanded SSI system with these
parameters, single elderly persons who receive $175 to $500 of
Social Security benefits per month would find their incomes
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brought up to the poverty line by the combination of SSI and
Social Security. Over time, the set aside would need to be
adjusted to reflect consumer price increases, but for joint Social
Security and SSI recipients with monthly Social Security benefits
of at least $175, income poverty would be erased.
The shortcomings of a means-tested SSI-type system are that it
would require recipients to submit a separate application, disclose
their assets, and face the stigma of welfare participation, even if
Social Security and SSI were received in one combined payment.
One alternative is a plan that maintains targeting to low-income
elders but at the same time avoids the welfare stigma of SSI.
• A new targeted minimum benefit guarantee
As an alternative to SSI, federal policymakers should consider
institution of a new income tested (but not asset tested) minimum
benefit guarantee set at the poverty line (roughly $650 per month)
within the Social Security system and separate from SSI. This
plan would give credit to all Social Security recipients for a
larger share of their benefit than does SSI (more than the current
$20 per month). The program would have a guarantee of $650
per month for beneficiaries with less than $400 per month of
Social Security benefits; provide a slightly lower than $200
subsidy for those with higher benefits ($400 or more); and would
then phase out to zero for those receiving $800 per month
(roughly 120 percent of the poverty line)
The benefit guarantee could be wage indexed to increase with the
average wages of all covered workers, or indexed to changes in
the poverty line itself. One hundred percent of all other sources of
income would be taxed by this program. Because the system
would be run by the Social Security Administration as part of its
regular operations, no stigma or take-up problems would arise as
long as the beneficiaries were identified and contacted by SSA
(e.g., those filing income taxes the year before, or those with low
benefits who are likely to qualify). And such a system would
benefit only those who qualify for Social Security to begin with.
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One could think of this as a targeted minimum benefit. Canada
has had great success with a similar system, a Guaranteed Income
Supplement (GIS) that provides minimum benefits in old age.
The program has reduced the rate of poverty among older single
woman from 21 to 8 percent over ten years (Smeeding 1998).
Targeting the Benefits to Groups in Need
To raise benefits for low-income elders at a reasonable cost,
benefits must be targeted, which means income testing and
possibly other types of restrictions such as asset testing to keep
costs down. For instance, benefits could be targeted to those
above a certain age (e.g., age 75 or 80) or to those receiving
benefits for more than a specified number of years if the
budgetary costs of these guaranteed benefits programs are too
high.
Both programs would provide a poverty-line income guarantee
for all elderly persons who participated in the system long
enough to collect benefits, but who were left for whatever reason
with below-poverty Social Security benefits at older ages.
Income-producing assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, checking accounts,
cash management funds, etc.) would be counted against the
poverty line guarantee to improve targeting.
Creating a Mutually Reinforcing Benefit Package
All three of these policies are mutually reinforcing and need to be
instituted together. Improving benefits for survivors, and shared
years of earnings credits for divorcees (coupled with own earning
years) will together shrink the pool of those who need to rely on
the minimum benefit package. Only never married women would
rely on the minimum benefit option alone to avoid poverty. Other
groups of women (over 93 percent of those aged 62 and over in
2020) would probably benefit from improved spousal benefits or
divorcee benefits as well.
Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
20
What Will It Cost?
Because of program and beneficiary interactions, the budgetary
costs of this program are difficult to calculate. The Social
Security Administration has estimated some of the spousal
benefit options. Because earnings sharing upon divorce might
simultaneously increase benefits for those with less than ten-year
marriages and perhaps reduce benefits for those with greater than
ten-year marriages, the net cost of this option is liable to be very
small. The targeted benefit options can also be tailored to fit
budgetary realities by changing parameters in the SSI system or
in the new targeted benefit. Our preliminary estimates are that all
three benefit changes would total less than one-half of one
percent of the long run payroll gap between revenues and outlays,
about $20.0 billion per year in 1998 dollars. However, the Social
Security Administration needs to more precisely estimate these
costs and the program interactions.
The long-run deficit issue requires closing a long-run payroll gap
of less than 2.10 percent between revenue and outlays
(Smeeding, Estes, and Glasse 1999, Table 4). Proposals that
reduce poverty and provide a true floor to older women’s
incomes at an estimated total cost of less than 25 percent of this
deficit do not seem to place extravagant demands on systemic
reform, and targeting these benefits toward economically
vulnerable older women or those with few other sources of
income would lower even these modest costs substantially. For
example, increasing Social Security benefits by 10 percent across
the board, for widows and widowers alike, is estimated to cost
$8.0 billion in 1999 dollars, about 2 percent of total Social
Security outlays (Congressional Budget Office 1999).
Conclusions and Future Steps
Social Security has made great advances in increasing the
retirement income of older people. But millions of older women
who live alone have not been able to increase their economic
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security. Inequalities in incomes and assets have not declined,
and the continuing economic boom of the 1990s has not benefited
all Americans equally. Divorce rates continue to climb among
older and middle-aged women, and more women are choosing to
raise children alone. These trends and the Social Security
projections presented here suggest that low-income elderly
women will be no better off in the future than they are today. If
we are to increase benefit adequacy and economic security for
these vulnerable elders, it makes sense to incorporate an effective
income floor into the Social Security system and changes in
divorcee benefits at the same time that we restore actuarial
balance to the system. Older women deserve such a commitment
and Social Security financial reform presents the opportunity to
all but eradicate poverty in old age.
In this Policy Brief we have discussed three separate but
interrelated proposals to improve the economic well-being of the
most vulnerable elderly: survivors, divorcees with less than a ten-
year marriage history, and very low-income beneficiaries. Each
of these groups are disproportionately women who will be at or
below the poverty line without the programmatic changes
suggested above. While details of these alternatives need further
refinement, a package such as this would improve benefit
adequacy of Social Security for older women and greatly reduce
their future risk of poverty at low or modest cost. Further and
better cost estimates by the Social Security Administration could
pinpoint these costs.
If the economy, private pensions, and assets all continue to grow,
the entire population, men and women alike, can look forward to
an economically secure old age. However, this outcome is
unlikely. Modest steps must be taken to assist those who are most
vulnerable—older women—while at the same time restoring the
financial health of the Social Security system. After all, older
women are, today and in the future, the most important
beneficiaries of the Social Security system.
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